Offer and Invitation to Treat
There are three main parts of a contract:
1.
Offer
2.
Acceptance
3.
Consideration
How to distinguish between an invitation to
treat and contract formation:
·
Entering into a contract
o There must be a distinction between simple bargaining and when the
offer actually transpires. There is no
intention in simple negotiations to enter into a contract.
o Power of acceptance is in the hands of the offeree.
o When the offeror makes an offer, terms are usually attached. There can only be acceptance if the offeree
accepts those terms exactly as they were stated by the offeror.
·
If there is a change in the
terms, you have a counter-offer; at
that point, the only offer on the table is the counter-offer.
·
Mirror image rule = terms made by the
offeror must match those that the offeree accepts. This is necessary for the formation of a
contract.
·
The distinction between an “offer” and an “invitation to treat” is contingent on the willingness of the offeror to be bound by the
next communication made by the offeree, so long as the offeror’s offer hasn’t
been withdrawn. The offeror may withdraw
the offer up until the time the offeree accepts or when the offer was stated to
become stale.
Canadian Dyers Association Ltd. V. Burton
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Facts
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Canadian Dyer’s asked the defendant for lowest price
for 29 Hannah Avenue, to which he responded in subsequent correspondence,
“[$1650] is the lowest I am prepared to accept […] if it were any other party
I would ask more”. The plaintiff
treated the defendant’s words as an offer and sent a deposit for $500, as
requested, and asked Burton to prepare a deed (a legal document that attaches
to any piece with property, with which you transfer property from one party
to the next). The defendant prepared
the deed and sent the draft back to Dyer’s, which included a closing
date. Five days after the closing
date, the defendant’s solicitor wrote back saying there was no contract and
returned the cheque for $500.
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Issues
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Was there a contract?
Did the correspondence constitute an offer or
invitation to treat?
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Holding
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The court held there was an offer and contract.
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Reasons
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While a mere quotation is
not an offer (ie. “this watch is $500”), the words of the defendant, that
“the price is the lowest I am wiling to
accept” and “if it were any other party, I would ask for more”, made him
bound to an offer. The words used were
critical.
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Ratio
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There can be no contract unless there is an offer to
sell and an acceptance of that offer.
Whether or not there is an offer will depend on the language used and
the circumstances of the particular case.
Courts can look to subsequent actions of the party to determine
whether the an offer was made or not.
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Comments
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[1920], (HC Ont), p. 18-20.
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Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v.
Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd.
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Facts
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Chemists’ Dept. was a pharmacy that had a section
with poison. Under the Pharmaceutical
and Poisons Act in effect at the time, there was a pharmacist present at all
time who could regulate if customers could purchase certain things. The Pharmaceutical Society said that the
pharmacy was not in compliance after two customers bought poisons they were
not supposed to be able to. The court
in effect had to determine at what point in a retail setting an offer is made
to the customer. This particular case
was an appeal after the Pharmaceutical Society lost at the trial level.
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Issues
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Was a contract completed as soon as the customer put
the item in their shopping cart (as the Pharmaceutical Society argued)?
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Holding
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An offer is not completed when a customer put the
item in the shopping cart; rather, it was simply an invitation to treat. The sale was deemed to be affected by and
under the control of the registered pharmacist because the act of taking
something off the shelf and putting it into the shopping cart was not an
acceptance of the offer. An offer is
done when the item is presented to the cash desk. The transaction is not complete until the
seller accepts the offer to buy. The
cashier ringing the item in is the acceptance.
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Reasons
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If the act of taking
something off the shelf and putting it into a shopping bin constitutes an
acceptance to offer, then the customer is unable to return the product to the
shelf in the event they change their minds; they would have already made an offer.
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Ratio
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The act of taking something from a shelf does not
amount to an acceptance of an offer because the goods on the shelf are an invitation to treat. An offer to buy and acceptance to sell
occurs at the cash register.
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Comments
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[1953], (CA), p. 20-23.
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Unilateral Contracts
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893],
(CA)
Makes Distinction
made between bilateral contracts (the common exchange of promises) and
unilateral contracts (a promise is made to a large mass of people and there
is no promise in return).
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Facts
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Carbolic Smoke Ball had an advertisement that made
an offer that they would give 100 pounds to people who used the Carbolic
Smoke Ball for two weeks, three times daily, and caught the flu. They said they were depositing the money at
a bank for the contest. Carlill
followed the directions and caught the flu.
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Issues
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Was a contract formed when the plaintiff performed
conditions set out in the advertisement?
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Holding
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Yes, a contract was formed. This was an example of a unilateral
contract.
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Reasons
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Bowen J. says “this is an
offer made to the entire world”. The
acceptance is when anyone comes forward and performs the conditions on the
faith of the advertisement. Carbolic said
it was not an offer made to the entire world, but “it was a mere puff”. There was no intention to have legal
relations; it was purely advertisement.
The Court said that it can’t be a mere puff when Carbolic said it was
going to deposit money. If you make
extravagant promises, you have to be held liable for them.
The issue Carbolic raised
was that there was no formal communication by Carlill of acceptance; the
general law is that you have to communicate acceptance. But, the court retorted, there was a
unilateral contract, and acceptance is only done in the matter in which it
was advertised. So unless you say how
acceptance is to come about, then you have to fulfill the reward. In other words, if there were other conditions
required, they had to be communicated, which they weren’t.
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Ratio
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Some advertisements can constitute offers where
there’s an offer to the world at large which is accepted by an act carried
out by the offeree in the mode required by the offerer.
A unilateral contract is a contract in which there
is a promise only on one side. The
consideration for which is not a return promise but the doing of some
act. On the other hand, a bilateral
contract is a promise made on both sides.
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Comments
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[1893], (CA), p. 25-29.
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Goldthope v. Logan
[1943], (CA)
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Facts
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There was an advertisement for an electrolysis
procedure to remove hairs, and the buyer (Logan) took up the seller’s
(Goldthorpe) “safe and permanent” guarantee.
Seller goes to buyer’s premises and is treated by employee of buyer. Seller is not satisfied, so she brought an
action on the basis of the advertisement.
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Issues
and Holding
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1)
Is there any negligence on the part of the
sellers that caused the damage? No.
2)
Was there a contract between the seller and
the plaintiff buyer? Yes.
3)
If so, what is the result in law of a breach
thereof on the part of the defendant?
See below.
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Reasons
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The advertisement was the
offer; the act of going to the place of business is acceptance. This was deemed a unilateral contract, and because the seller did not fulfill its
guarantee there was a breach of contract.
Often, when looking for a remedy, courts will try to put the aggrieved
party in the position they’d be in if the contract were fulfilled, which is
what the court did in this case.
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Ratio
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The unilateral contract provides a technique to
ensure the enforcement of promises made to the public at large.
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Comments
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Appeal: BUYER PLAINTIFF (Logan) v. SELLER DEFENDANT
(Goldthorpe), [1943], (CA), pp. 30-35
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The Tendering Process
- The
tendering process is a process where an invitation for contractors to put
forward bids for a project. So the
specifications are given for a project and they invite tender bids.
- The
tendering process begins with the “invitation to tender” or the “tender
call”, which sets out the nature of the project. It also includes governing governing the
submissions (ie. “you must submit it on Tuesday”). One of the most common term is the privilege clause, which entitles
the offerer to choose any bids it chooses, including one which isn’t the
lowest offer.
- Before
Rv. Ron Engineering, the tendering process used to be treated like an
invitation to treat, where the bid that was submitted was an offer, and
the process of accepting one of the bids and communicating to the winner
was acceptance.
- But then
it was found that those doing the tender bidding had no recourse in the
event of a grievance. R. v. Ron
Engineering changed all this by Estey J. conceiving the tendering process
as consisting of two contracts; contract A for the tendering process, and
contract B for the successful bidder to execute the action.
R. v. Ron Engineering & Construction
(Eastern) Ltd. [1981], (SCC)
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Facts
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The government makes a call for tenders, to which
Ron Engineering misleadingly submits the lowest bid, which made it a
erroneous offer which was disqualified, and thus lost their deposit to the
government. Ron Engineering claimed
they were trying to withdraw their offer to amend it.
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Issues
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Was the contractor entitled to withdraw the tender
and were they entitled to recover the deposit?
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Holding
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They are entitled to recover their deposit.
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Reasons
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Estey J. goes on to
distinguish between contract A and contract B, which changes the nature of
the tender call. Now, when the offeror
makes a call for tenders, a unilateral offer is made for contract A. In effect, the terms become “if you accept,
we enter into contract A”. Contract B
is entered into with the successful bidder.
Contract A is purely an administrative consideration, and the deposit
is the consideration for contract A.
In this case, contract A
was entered into with Ron Engineering.
They didn’t enter into contract B.
The court then noted that the purpose of the deposit is to oblige the
contractors to actually follow through with the construction project.
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Ratio
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A tender invitation and a tender bid are seen as
being a unilateral contract that is brought into being almost immediately on
the submission of the bid.
Contract B, which deals with the terms and
conditions of the building contract, is entered into subsequent to the
formation of contract A.
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Comments
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CROWN v. TENDERER (Ron Engineering), [1981], (SCC),
pp. 35-37
NOTE 4 on p. 37:
We have subsequent cases that say “Ron Engineering is correct, but the
initial contract A is not just a unilateral contract, but it’s a bilateral
contract that creates obligations on both sides”. It refers you to a Nova Scotia supreme
court case that holds this proposition.
It goes on to talk specifically about privilege clauses: so the
drafter of the invitation can alter the balance of the bilateral contract in
its favour.
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Harvela Investments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.
of Canada (C.I.) Ltd. [1986], HL
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Facts
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Defendant (Royal Trust) makes invitation to treat
for others to purchase its shares, and said it would accept the highest
bid. Sir Leonard, a bidder, placed a
referential bid with a condition that it have a bid that submits 101 000
above the next highest offer. Harvela
made the technical highest bid, which was of course superseded by Sir
Leonard.
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Issues
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Was Sir Leonard’s referential bid valid?
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Holding
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It was not.
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Reasons
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Court says you can either
auction through referential bidding or you can require fixed bids; and the
court found this to be a fixed bidding auction because there was no statement
in the invitation that the bidding would be referential. This made Sir Leonard’s bidding
invalid. Also, when the highest bid is
requested, it is implied that it is a fixed bid.
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Ratio
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A referential
bid must be clearly and unambiguously authorized in the invitation to treat.
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Comments
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BIDDER PLAINTIFF (Harvela) v. SELLER DEFENDANT
(Royal Trust), [1986], (HL), pp. 33-35
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MJB Enterprises Ltd. v. Defence Construction
Ltd. [1999], (SCC)
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Facts
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Tender call made by defendant (Defence
Construction), who accepted the bid of Sorochan (bid didn’t include all
project possibilities), which turned out to be non-compliant. Sorochan got the project anyway. MJB (plaintiff) was the second lowest bid
and sued. The defendant argued that it
exercised its rightful privilege clause.
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Issues
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Does the “privilege clause” allow the owner to choose
a non-compliant bid?
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Holding
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No.
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Reasons
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So court essentially
decides that the core issue issue is whether the intention of the parties was
to focus only on compliant bids.
The court says the
privilege clause does not exempt a party to the obligation to accept only
compliant bids. For the defendant to
have accepted a non-compliant bid was contrary to the express indication in
the instruction for tenders. The court
found that, by looking at the intention of the parties and the rules, there
was an implied term that only compliant tenders would be accepted. The rules read in conjunction with the
privilege clause suggests that the whole tender bid implied compliance. Otherwise, why would you have rules?
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Ratio
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The privilege clause must be compatible with the
obligation to accept only a compliant bid.
However, the privilege clause does allow the owner to pick a bid other
than the lowest.
Tender documents must express all the operative
terms clearly.
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Comments
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BUYER PLAINTIFF (MJB) v. SELLER DEFENDANT (Defence
Construction), [1999], SCC, pp. 38-46.
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Communication of Offer
- An offer
must be communicated so that it can be accepted. The integral part is that the offeror
knows he/she’s making an offer; there must be a meeting of the minds.
- For there
to be a meeting of the minds, there must also be an intention to accept
the offer.
- When the
offer is communicated, it is often communicated with other details like
terms and conditions. For the offer
to be valid, the parties must both agree with the terms and conditions. If it differs in any way, it’s a
counter-offer and the original offer is off the table.
- However,
there are exceptions. The
intentions and actions of the offeror can also come into play and suggest
certain things, like an offer, acceptance, or terms and conditions.
Blair v. Western Mutual Benefit Assn., [1972],
(BC CA), pp. 47-49
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Facts
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Plaintiff was a stenographer for the defendant who
transcribed every meeting. In one of
the meetings, there was a resolution that, if she retired, she would be granted
$8 000. She only learned about the
resolution through her job transcribing the minutes of the meeting, and no
one communicated to her personally about this consideration. She retired and expected $8 000 as per the
resolution passed by the Board of Directors.
The defendant argues that because the offer was not communicated to
her there was no offer.
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Issues
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Was the resolution to give the appellant employee at
least two years salary upon retirement an offer accepted for valid
consideration?
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Holding
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No.
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Reasons
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Just because the employee
came across this information by her position in the company, it was not a
validly communicated offer. The
resolution was simply an act made by the board of directors and did not put
her in a position of acceptance.
McFarlane JA noted that
there’s no evidence that P did actually accept the offer and therefore didn’t
create a legally binding contract.
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Ratio
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1)
A communicated offer to one person cannot
necessarily be reasonably understood to be an offer to another.
2)
If an offer is not communicated formally or
otherwise to the other party then it cannot, on the facts alone, create or
intend to create an offer capable of acceptance.
·
There must be an intention to accept that
offer. Courts generally assume, based
on the conditions in the offer, that that person has the intention to accept
the offer.
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Comments
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PLAINTIFF (Blair) v. Defendant (Western Mutual),
[1972], (BC CA).
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Williams v. Carwardine [1833],
(KB), pp. 50-51
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Facts
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The defendant (Carwardine) publishes an offer to
anyone who is able to give information that leads to the discovery and
conviction of the murders of his brother for 20 pounds. This is a unilateral contract. Four months after the offer was published,
the plaintiff (Williams) came forward after she was severely beaten by the
murderer. Thinking she doesn’t have
long to live and wanting to clear her conscience, she exposes the identity of
the killer, which leads to a conviction.
D challenges P’s compliance with the conditions saying “her intention
was not to fulfull the terms of the offer”; in other words, she wasn’t
induced by the reward.
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Issues
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Was the plaintiff entitled to the reward, having
given the information which led to the conviction of the murderer, even
though she may not have been induced by the reward to give this information,
entitled to the reward?
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Holding
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Yes, she was.
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Reasons
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The court found that the
plaintiff is entitled to the reward because there was a contract that existed
between P and D because P fulfilled the condition of the offer. Also, P had knowledge of existence of the
offer (as the court found that several advertisements of the reward were up
and around P’s dwelling).
The judge also notes that
motive, which the D said P did not have, is irrelevant.
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Ratio
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The motive of the informer in accepting the reward
has nothing to do with his right to recover under the contract, but they must have knowledge of the offer.
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Comments
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PLAINTIFF (Williams) v. DEFENDANT (Carwardine),
[1833], (KB).
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R. v. Clarke
[1927], (Aust HC), pp 51-53
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Facts
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The Crown offers a reward for the arrest and
conviction of a person responsible for murder. Clarke provides the information that leads
to the conviction of the murderers.
Without his information, there would have been no conviction. The distinguishing fact in this case with
that of Williams v Carwardine is
that he had no intention of accepting the offer. His motive was simply to clear himself of
the charge of murder. Recall that in
order to have a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds, otherwise
that you have no contract. There was
no meeting of the minds here.
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Issues
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Was there a contract established between the Crown
and Clarke?
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Holding
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There as no contract established between the Crown
and Clarke.
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Reasons
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They cite Williams/Carwardine and how that case
merely determined that motive is not important. The Court argued that the distinguishing
factor in that case was that the informer knew of the offer and meant to
accept the offer when she gave her information. The difference here is that
Clarke, although he saw the offer, admitted that he either forgot about it or
didn’t think about it when he gave his information to the Crown.
Clarke rebut that
presumption that there was an intention to accept the offer by virtue of his
own admission that he forgot about the offer.
But the Court said that
there cannot be acceptance of an offer without knowledge of the offer. And ignorance of the offer is the same,
whether it is due to never seeing it or forgetting about it after hearing
about it. This is the distinguishing
feature between R v Clarke and Williams.
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Ratio
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1) Where the offer invites conduct on the part of
the offeree as the acceptance of the offer, the conduct must be undertaken not only with knowledge of the offer but
with an intention to accept the offer.
2) The motive of the offeree in providing the
conduct requested by the offeror is immaterial.
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Comments
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Acceptance
An offer provides the offeree with the
power of acceptance. In order for the
offeree to communicate a valid acceptance, it has to be on the same terms and
conditions of the offer. If there is no
acceptance to the same terms and conditions of the offer, then there is no consensus adidum. If the communication of the offeree is on
different terms and conditions as the original offer, that is deemed a
counter-offer. The counter-offer gives
power of acceptance to the original offeror; so the roles reverse if the
offeree makes a counter-offer. In this
case, not the power of acceptance is with the original offeror and the original
offer is deemed to be off the table. If
the offeror does not accept the the counter-offer, there is no contract. If they accept the counter-offer, there is a contract
on the terms and conditions of the counter-offer.
Counter-offer
Livingstone v Evans [1925],
(Alta. SC)
Counter-offer
doesn’t kill original offer because of language.
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Facts
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Defendant writes to plaintiff and offers to sell
land for $1800. The plaintiff replies
and says “send lowest cash price, will give $1600” (which is the
counter-offer). Defendant says “Cannot
reduce price”. The plaintiff then
accepts the original offer of $1800.
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Issues
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Was there a binding contract?
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Holding
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Yes, there was a binding contract.
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Reasons
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Cites Hyde v Wrench, which says the making of a counter-offer results
in the rejection of the original offer.
You can use this case to prove that point. But they distinguish Hyde from the case Stevenson,
Jacques, & Co. v McLean because in Hyde the rejection of the offer was not a new proposal but a mere
inquiry, and therefore the original offer was still on the table. The judge argued that Hyde had established that making a counter-offer is a rejection
of the offer. They said that the
plaintiff’s telegram in response to the offer consisted of a counter-offer
AND an inquiry; the court interpreted the telegram as saying “we’ll 1600 or
send your lowest price”. The court
said this put an end to the defendant’s liability under the offer unless it
was revived by the telegram (which the court said it was). This changed everything.
The reason it was original
offer was revived was because “cannot reduce price” meant they still stood by
their original offer of 1800 and were willing to accept it. “Cannot reduce price” signalled that the
offer still stood at 1800. The wording
made the original offer still on the table.
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Ratio
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As an exception to the general rule that a
counter-offer destroys the original offer, the Court may decide that the
original offer is still open on the basis of the language used and the intermittent
feelings of the parties.
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Comments
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Battle of the
Forms
- Often in the course of negotiations, there are separate forms
used by the buyer and seller.
Generally, when you look at the reverse side of these forms, you’ll
see terms and conditions (TC).
Often times during these negotiations, the TC don’t match, and the
question becomes “whose terms prevail?”
- The person who gets in the last show makes the counter-offer
and therefore prevails.
- The act of acceptance is holding on to the goods. If you send back the goods without
accepting (immediately), then you’re not deemed to have accepted the
TCs. Last shot rule or performance
rule.
Butler Machine Tool Co. v Ex-Cell-O Corp. [1979],
(CA)
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Facts
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The buyer (defendant) makes an inquiry to seller for
the price of a machine tool. The
seller gives a quote indicating the price of 75 535 pounds. The seller’s offer includes TC1 (terms and
conditions) that say the price can change at the time of delivery to reflect
the price at that time. The buyer
givens an order form with TC2 that did not include a price increase
clause. So the order form is deemed to
be a counter-offer to TC1. On the
order form there is a tear off slip which acknowledges TC2 which they are to
return to the buyer. The seller does
that in accordance with the quote for 75 535 pounds.
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Issues
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Was there a contract and on whose terms?
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Holding
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There was a contract and it’s on the buyer’s terms
(TC2).
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Reasons
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The buyer’s TC2 are
accepted because the seller signed off the tear-off slip agreeing to the
terms and conditions; TC2 prevailed because the seller acknowledged them by
signing the tear-off slip and sending it back to the buyer. The
“counter-offer kills the original offer”.
Lord Denning says the
traditional approach is outdated and proposes an alternative analytical
method that says the TC of both parties need to be construed together. He says that if they can be reconciled in a
harmonious fashion, then great. BUT if
they’re irreconcilable so much so that they’re contrary, the conflicting
terms must be scrapped and replaced by a reasonable implication.
Lord Denning goes on to
say that the documents need to be viewed in terms of the whole, and that the
June 5 document (when the sellers sent back the tear-off slip) is the
decisive document and therefore the terms are on the buyer’s TC2. The seller’s reference to the earlier offer
was held by the court to be merely a reference to price the identity of the
subject matter.
So there are two ways to
analyze the battle of the forms:
1) Traditional offer and acceptance.
2) Courts can look at the documents as a
whole to make a determination as to which TCs prevail.
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Ratio
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Comments
|
Use Lord Denning’s approach when you’re DEFENDING
THE SELLER. If you’re DEFENDING THE
BUYER, then use the traditional approach (LAST SHOT RULE). Also note, Lord Denning’s approach is not
law in Canada.
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Mirror Image
Rule for TCs
Tywood Industries Ltd. v St. Anne-Nackawic
Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd. [1979], (Ont HC)
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Facts
|
An invitation to tender was called by defendant,
whose document had 13 terms and conditions, none of which have an arbitration
clause. Plaintiff (buyer) replied with
a quotation in letter form, but the reverse side contained 12 TCs, which also
didn’t contain an arbitration clause.
Clause 12 of TC2 (TC of the buyer) essentially stated that the TC of
TC2 are to prevail no matter what. The
plaintiff then submitted a revised proposal that had the same 12 conditions
that were on the original.
The defendant then placed two purchase orders. On the reverse side of the order form were
TCs, one of which made reference to an arbitration clause. So it was different from the revise
proposal of the plaintiff.
Neither purchase orders were signed by the
plaintiffs nor returned to the defendant, but the goods were delievered to
the defendant. This act usually
signifies acceptance.
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Issues
|
Is the plaintiff (seller) bound to the conditions on
the reverse side of the purchase order form to resolve disputes of
arbitration even though they did not acknowledge those terms and conditions?
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Holding
|
No, they are not bound.
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Reasons
|
This is a commercial
transaction and terms may have been accepted but the conduct of both parties
indicate that neither party considered any other terms than those found on
the face of the documents (ie. Price and subject matter).
Last shot rule prevails in
Canada. But Tywood, which is a spinoff
of Butler, doesn’t follow this.
The whole basis was that
they didn’t bring forth an arbitration clause.
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Ratio
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Where the TCs are not mere images, the intentions
should be drawn to the TCs in order to make them binding; draw attention to
TCs that both parties were operating under.
Under
the traditional analysis, however, there would be a strong argument that the
defendant’s offer constituted the last shot and the defendant’s performance
emphasized it.
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Comments
|
Uses contract analysis in a way similar to Lord
Denning, probably because both were determined in the same year. But it is not the most prevalent view in
Canada. The prevalent view is the
traditional doctrine. Sometimes that
will bring you to the same conclusion, but most of the time it will not.
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Electronic
ProCD v Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken
Mountain Web Services, Inc. [1996] (US CA)
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|
Facts
|
Software was purchased and the TCs are agreed to
when you once installs the program. This
is a similar circumstance, but one of the TCs was that this program was
limited to non=commercial purposes.
The defendant (Zeidenberg) used the software for commercial purposes
and the plaintiff (ProCD) sought an injunction.
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Issues
|
Is there a contract between ProCD and the defendant
in that the defendant must obey the TCs of the shrinkwrap license.
Note that this seems
straight-forward, but back then it was rather novel.
The question posed to the Court was “were the TCs in
the program a contract such that the defendant had to comply to the terms not
to use if for commercial terms.
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Holding
|
Yes, a contract was formed.
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Reasons
|
It was a contract where
there was an exchange of money before the customer saw the TCs. They talk about the UCC (which is the US
version of the Sales and Goods Act) and how the UCC allowed for contracts to
be formed this way.
Here the defendant had no
choice but to read the license to proceed into the program, and unless you
accepted the TCs, the program would not allow you to proceed. Whether you read them or not was
irrelevant. You had to signify
acceptance under those TCs.
Under the UCC, the buyer
has the ability to inspect goods before he either accepts them or rejects
them. The defendant has the
opportunity not to use the product.
They said the defendant
tried the software, accepted the license and did not return the goods.
|
Ratio
|
1) The offeror may invite acceptance by conduct and
may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes
acceptance. The offeree may accept the
TCs by performing the acts that the offeror poses to treat as acceptance.
2) Computer software shrinkwrap licenses are
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to
contracts in general..
|
Comments
|
Silence: Still
Acceptance
Dawson v Helicopter Exploration Company
|
|
Facts
|
Plaintiff has stake in mineral deposits in BC. Defendant responds that he wants to try and
buy some of P’s stake, to which P responds stating his interest. D says “if you take me out to the mineral
deposits and the lands are worth buying, I’ll give you 10% interest”. D says he “hereby agrees”. P responds stating if D can get (1) a pilot
and (2) a release from the Navy, he’d have a deal. D then calls the deal off. REVIEW FACTS
|
Issues
|
Was there a contract that was binding? Was it a unilateral or bilateral?
Was the silence of the two year period (when D
engaged another company to take them to the land) an abandonment of the
contract?
Was there a revocation of P’s unilateral offer or
D’s unilateral offer?
|
Holding
|
There was a bilateral contract.
There is no abandonment of the contract.
And there was no revocation of D’s unilateral offer.
|
Reasons
|
ESTEY:
Letter of March 5 was an
offer. Letter of April 12 was
acceptance.
Says that, “although acceptance
must be absolute and unequivocal, it need not be in express terms but can be
implied from language and conduct”.
There is no authority to
hold that silence, on its own, signifies an abandonment of a contract. Silence may be evidence of repudiation.
RAND:
The offeree’s first offer
is for a unilateral contract.
April 12 was acceptance
but it was subject to performance by the offeree being granted leave from the
Nacy. Therefore it was a bilateral
contract.
MEJALLI NOTE: Here, there
is a tendency of the courts to treat offers as bilateral contracts rather
than unilateral ones where the language can so be construed.
|
Ratio
|
1) Silence alone does not constitute an abandonment
of a contract, but rather you have to look at the circumstances of each case.
2) Acceptance must be clear but it need not be
expressed. Rather, it can be implied
from the language and the conduct of the parties.
3) There is a tendency of the courts to treat offers
as calling for a bilateral rather than a unilateral contract. This is because unilateral contracts place
the onus on one party.
|
Comments
|
St. John Tub Boat v Irving Refinery
Silence can be a mode of acceptance.
|
|
Facts
|
D (Irving Refinery) employed the services of P (St.
John) to keep tugboats on shore at all times to guide boats into a harbour.
P offered these services, and D was asked to respond
as to how to continue. D makes a
verbal agreement for tugboats to be continued to be on hand at all times for
a month.
After the end of this contracted period, they
parties agreed to extend it for two months.
Near the end of this two month period, a new president took over D’s
company. P kept supplying tugboats and
eventually, after D refused to pay, D brought an action to recover the money
do on the invoices.
|
Issues
|
Whether or not D’s course of conduct (their
acquiescence of action) during the months in question constituted a
continuing acceptance of these offers so as to give rise to a binding
contract to pay for the stand-by services of the tugboats at the rate specified
in the invoices?
|
Holding
|
Yes, there was a contract during these months.
|
Reasons
|
The SCC construed the P’s
actions of making the tugboats available after the contract ended as a new
offer. The terms of this offer were
the same as the earlier two-month contract.
The respondent here didn’t
choose to discontinue the services, they just did nothing. They didn’t challenge their presence being
there, they didn’t bring them to the attention of anyone in P, they didn’t
act to terminate the unnecessary services, BUT they didn’t pay for them.
SO leaving the tugboats on
shore was the OFFER, and the silence was the ACCEPTANCE.
So the court concluded
that D’s conduct was sufficient of acceptance, and the trial judges’ judgment
was restored.
|
Ratio
|
Sometimes acceptance can be inferred from the
conduct of parties, as well as the words.
|
Comments
|
Note that this is contrary to the explicit
communication we’ve seen.
|
Silence: No
Acceptance
Belthouse v Bindley
Silence
cannot be used as a mode of acceptance.
|
|
Facts
|
P is an uncle who agrees to buy a horse from his
nephew, which ultimately turned out to contain a misunderstanding (guineas
vs. pounds). So there’s an agreement
between them. Uncle then makes
counter-offer that says “if there’s silence, I’ll assume the horse is mine
for 30 pounds”.
The nephew has an auction for various things and the
auctioneer (D) accidentally sells the horse even though he was told not
to. After the auction, the nephew
writes P telling him what happened, and so the uncle then brought an action
against D for conversion of the horse.
At trial, the uncle won and was awarded 33 pounds
(30 guineas).
|
Issues
|
Was there a contract between the uncle and the
nephew such that the defendant sold the uncle’s property interest in the
horse?
|
Holding
|
No, there was no contract.
|
Reasons
|
Because of the price
misunderstanding, the Court said there was no complete bargain (agreement)
and there was no intention for the uncle to pay 30 guineas.
Because the nephew didn’t
say respond to P’s counter-offer, which had a condition for silence as
acceptance, the court said there was no complete bargain between the two
parties, and therefore no agreement.
So this case says you can’t have conditions that say something like “if
you don’t respond, we have a contract”.
The court acknowledged
that that the nephew thought he sold the horse as well, but said that because
he didn’t communicate his acceptance of the counter-offer.
So even if both sides
believe there is a contract, you have to fulfill the complete requirements of
a bargain, which includes communication of acceptance.
|
Ratio
|
You must communicate acceptance and silence is not a
mode of acceptance.
BUT, remember, there are some situations where
silence can be used as acceptance, like in the Tugboat or Dawson/Helicopter
cases.
|
Comments
|
THIS CASE CONTRASTS WITH GOOD SILENCE.
|
Mode of
Acceptance
Eliason v Henshaw [1819],
(US L Ed)
Mode
of acceptance specified by the offeror must be followed for acceptance.
|
|
Facts
|
The buyers wanted to buy flour, and wrote a letter
to seller saying “please write by return of wagon to accept our offer”. They gave the letter with the person who
drove the wagon and desired acceptance by return of the wagon.
Acceptance needs to be made with compliance of
offeror’s offer.
The day after the letter was received by the seller,
he accepted it, but he sent the letter to Georgetown, misunderstanding the
instruction, sending it a letter to the buyer’s premises, not with the
wagon. The letter arrives a month
later.
After receiving the letter, the buyer mails back a
letter saying he didn’t want the flour anymore because he bought it from
somewhere else, and because he didn’t receive the response by wagon.
The seller still sent the flour to the buyer and the
buyer refused to accept it.
Sellers bring an action against the buyer.
|
Issues
|
Did the sellers’ acceptance of the offer by mail, as
opposed to the wagon, mean that the buyer was no longer obligated to purchase
the flower?
|
Holding
|
Yes, they weren’t obligated.
|
Reasons
|
The court says the buyer
contemplated receiving acceptance by wagon, and he knew how long the wagon’s
journey was. So when he stipulated the
response by wagon, he stipulated that he wanted the wagon to return back with
the flour. So once the flour did not
return with the wagon, they bought their flour elsewhere.
The place the buyer
stipulated the flour be sent was essential to the contract. Because there was no return, there was no
contract. The acceptance was sent to
Georgetown, and because the communication was sent to the wrong place, there
was no contract.
|
Ratio
|
The offeror is the master of the offer and sets out
the terms and conditions of the offer, which the offeree must accept on the
TCs made by the offeror.
Any qualification or departure from those terms in validates
the offer, unless it’s agreed to by the other party.
|
Comments
|
Communication of Acceptance
- Consensus adidum theory: there must be a meeting of the
minds. For this to happen,
acceptance must be communicated to the offeror.
- There are two instances where silence constitutes an acceptance
of an offer:
- 1) Conduct of the offeree
- Where silence of the offeree is reasonably understood by the
offeror to indicate acceptance of the offer. Here, it’s the conduct of the offeree
that’s important, and it’s the conduct that signals the acceptance of
the offer.
- 2) Cases where the offeror, in making his offer, has waived
the requirement to communicate acceptance. Not like in Belthouse where someone says “if you don’t respond, there’s
an offer”, but rather in the manner of Carbolic Smoke Ball. Here there’s no need to say to the
offeror that “I’m going to comply with the instructions.
- As the master of the offer, the offeror is able to dicate
whatever manner of acceptance is deemed appropriate, and that is incl
Postal
Acceptance Rule
·
Exception to the general
principle that acceptance has to be communicated to the offeror.
·
When you accept an offer in the mail, it’s at the exact moment you
post the letter that acceptance was communicated, not the date the offeror receives
the mail.
·
To communicate the mail, the
mail has to either be in a format that the offeror wanted you to reply in OR
the offer must have been made by mail.
·
If the acceptance is lost in
the mail, it’s still effective against the offeror. Why?
Because it took effect once it was placed in the mail box, and that’s
when the contract was crystallized.
·
If the offeror decides to
revoke his offer and he sends his revocation in the mail, if the offeree gets
it before it before sending acceptance, the offer is revoked. However, if he doesn’t and he sends his
acceptance in the mail, the acceptance trumps the revocation because the
acceptance takes place when it’s dropped in the mail.
·
Jurisdictions:
o
The jurisdiction in which the
acceptance is mailed from is the legal jurisdiction that is intra vires.
·
The postal acceptance rule
doesn’t apply where it’s clear the offeror wants… VERIFY THIS
Postal Rule
Does not Apply
Holwell Securities v Hughes [1974],
(CA)
A
request by the offeror of “notice in writing” does not enact the postal
acceptance
rule.
Here, the postal service rule does not apply.
|
|
Facts
|
Offeror (D) makes offer to offeree (P) for real
estate. Offeror said the option was
open in writing for 6 months since the offer was presented.
Offeree hires a lawyer expressing a desire to
purchase the real estate, and so it was mailed. Letter was mailed never received by
offeror.
Offeree is arguing that the Postal Acceptance rule
should be applied; acceptance was done the day they mailed it.
So Offeree sues for specific performance of the real
estate.
|
Issues
|
Did the plaintiff exercise an option to purchase the
premises by posting a letter to the defenant which he never received?
|
Holding
|
No.
|
Reasons
|
You must comply stricty
with the terms of the option. And in
this option there was a clause that said “notice in writing was
required”. Not acceptance in writing, but NOTICE
in writing, thus eliminating the postal rule.
There was no contract.
Acceptance had to actually be communicated to the offeror.
The court said the postal
acceptance acceptance rule doesn’t apply where the offeror requires notice
and it doesn’t apply where its application would produce manifest
inconvenience and absurdity. They say
this manifest inconvenience is a wider principle and the postal service rule
applies in situations where the negotiations between parties were clear in
that the offeror wanted “notice by acceptance”.
The court said here it was
clear by way of the wording and negotiations of the parties that the offeror
required notice by the offeree and not by way of writing.
|
Ratio
|
Where you have an option and it says “notice in
writing”, the postal rule will not apply because the law relating to options
is that the grantee must comply strictly with the conditions stipulated.
|
Comments
|
Postal Rule
Does Apply
Household Fire & Carriage Accident
Insurance Co. v Grant [1879], (CA)
Affirms
postal acceptance rule.
|
|
Facts
|
Grant applies for shares in Household. Notice of allotment is sent by Household
but is never received by Grant.
The company goes into bankruptcy and they go after
the defendant for the price they agreed to pay for the shares.
Defendant says he didn’t know he was a shareholder,
so he declined to pay for the price of the shares.
At the trial stage, two questions were left to the
jury:
i)
Was the letter posted in the mail? Yes
ii)
Was the letter of allotment received by the
defendant? No.
Household won but Grant appealed.
|
Issues
|
Was there a contract despite the fact the defendant
did not rcceive the letter of allotment?
|
Holding
|
Yes. Trial
decision upheld.
|
Reasons
|
Court said post office is
agent for both parties, and as soon as a letter is delivered to the post
office, the contract is made as complete.
The offeror, as the maker of the offer, can always avoid the postal
acceptance rule by stating in his offer that he must receive communication of
acceptance. But in this case, that was
a term of the offer.
Here, the offeror trusted
the post as a means of communication, so the onus is on the offeree that if
he didn’t receive any communication in regards of the offer, he can make the
inquiries of the offeror to see if he sent any acceptance.
BRAMWELL
DISSENT
Thought that when there’s
an offer, the acceptance must be communicated to the offeror. Lacking any communication, there is no
offer. Unless the parties have
specifically agreed that delivery of the acceptance letter to the post office
would be a means of communicating acceptance, it would otherwise be
unreasonable that the offeror would take the risk, particularly because it
could be lost.
|
Ratio
|
If the parties have contemplated the post as a
medium of communication for the contract, then the contract is completed as
soon as the letter accepting the offer was put into the post regardless of
the fact the letter was never received.
|
Comments
|
In today’s society, postal rule only applies where
(1) offeror does not provide an additional mode of communication or (2)
doesn’t apply where it would lead to an absurdity or inconvenience (example:
if the mail people placed the letter in the wrong box) and (3) it only
applies where the letter of acceptance is properly stamped and has a correct
address.
|
Instantaneous
Communication
·
This concerns electronic
communication, like e-mail, faxing, etc.
·
Here, the rule is different
from the post office rule. Courts accept
the general principle that when someone receives communication in instantaneous
communication, that’s when the acceptance crystallizes.
·
This begs the question of “what
happens if it’s laying on someone’s fax machine but they haven’t looked at it
yet?” It’s acceptance the moment it
comes out of the machine, but it’s the person accepting the message’s
responsibility to read it.
Brinkibon
Ltd. V. Stahag Stahl und Stahl Warenhandelsgesellschaft,
[1983], (HL)
|
|
Facts
|
The P are the buyers from the UK, and are suing the
sellers (D) who are from Austria. They
sue for breach of contract in the supply of steel. The first thing to be determined is the jurisdiction
which is supposed to apply, so that’s the issue here.
There are telephone conversations between the two
parties and faxes between both.
|
Issues
|
Is an acceptance of an offer by telex from London
but received in Vienna a contract made within the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom?
|
Holding
|
No, because the acceptance is received in Vienna, so
jurisdiction of Vienna governs.
|
Reasons
|
WILBERFORCE J.:
If the acceptance is sent
by post or telegram, then it is completed when it is put in the hand of the
postal agent in London, but we’re dealing with a telex here. And a telex is treated like a phone
conversation or other methods of instantaneous communication, so it is
completed when it is received by the offeree.
But note, no universal rule can cover all instantaneous modes of
communication. If there’s a conflict,
you should look at the intentions of the parties and sound business
practices.
OTHER JUDGE:
Says telex should be
treated like other forms of communication.
When a message has been
received on an offeror’s telex, it is his responsibility to arrange for a
prompt handling of the message. Another reason for this is to be a general
proposition (the message is completed when it is received by the other
party’s device) is so that the offeree can tell when the acceptance is
received by the offeror. So it makes
more sense to say when its received by the offeror that the contract is
formed, because if there’s a delivery failure, the offeree can know and send
acceptance again.
|
Ratio
|
In cases of instantaneous communication, the
contract is completed when received by the offeror and in the jurisdiction
where the acceptance is received by the offeror, unless the failure of the
offeror to receive the communication of acceptance sent by the offeree or
from a defect in the communication with respect to which the offeror should be
deemed to have assumed the risk.
|
Comments
|
Rudder v Microsoft Corp
[1999], (Ont. SC)
|
|
Facts
|
D was an online service provider, and they were
located in Washington. P was a
subscriber of D’s group. P claimed
damages for breach of contract (a class action), breach of fiduciary duty,
misappropriation and punitive damages together with accounting and injunctive
relief (in other words, they brought an action).
The contract which they said they breached was the
“Member Agreement”, which required all members to approve electronically
prior to using the service. So the
class of plaintiffs were all members to the agreement.
The agreement had a clause that Washington was to be
the jurisdiction; a jurisdiction clause.
P wanted the jurisdiction of Ontario to apply, arguing that the
jurisdiction clause only read in portions because it didn’t show up on the
first screen of the member agreement.
Therefore, it should be treated as fine print.
|
Issues
|
Was the contract formed on the basis of clicking on
“I agree” icon on the screen?
If so, did the acceptance apply to all the terms set
out in the agreement, including those not read by the offeree.
|
Holding
|
Yes and yes.
|
Reasons
|
Court said, generally in
Canada, there is a general deference given to form selection clauses
(requiring the reader to know all TCs before accepting), unless there is a
strong reason to override the agreement.
The burden of which lies with the plaintiff. The threshold for this to apply must also
go beyond mere inconvenience.
Disagreed with P because,
the Court said, it’s the offeree’s responsibility to read the terms. The screen required users to read the
terms.
The court also found that
there was no such fine print despite the fact that they couldn’t appear on
the screen all at the same time.
Court found in favour of
D.
|
Ratio
|
Normal rules of contract formation that are
applicable to agreement in writing are also applicable to agreements made in
electronic forms.
Acceptance may be communicated by simply clicking on
“I agree” icon, and such acceptance is held to apply to all TCs, including
those not read by the offeree.
|
Comments
|
Formation of Offer
Termination -
Valid Revocation
·
As long as the offer’s still
out there, the offeror has the ability to revoke the offer. It remains standing until the offer has been
accepted by the offeree. At the moment
in time the offer is accepted by the offeree, the offeror cannot revoke the
offer.
·
When an offeror wants to revoke
his offer, it must be communicated to the offeree. The reasoning behind this is that if an
offeree does not know the offer is revoked, in their mind it’s still capable of
being accepted. Furthermore, if
knowledge of revocation was not required, the offeree could be relying on the
offer.
Dickinson v Dodds
[1876], (CA)
|
|
Facts
|
Offeror (Dodds) sends memo to offeree (Dickinson)
saying that he is agreeing to sell to the plaintiff property for 800
pounds. The offer was said to remain
open until Friday at 9 am.
On Thursday, offeree is informed by another party
that the offeror was agreeing to sell the property to someone else.
Offeree decides, since the offer was to remain valid
until Friday, to accept the offer.
Does this formally in writing on Thursday with the offeror’s
mother-in-law. She forgets to give it
to the offeror, but on Friday morning, the agent for the offeree saw the
offeror and tried to give him a copy of the acceptance. The offeror says it’s too late, saying he
already sold to another party.
Minutes later, the offeree tries to give acceptance,
and he is also denied.
|
Issues
|
If an offer has been made for the sale of property
and, before that offer is accepted, the offeror enters into a binding
agreement to sell the property to somebody else, and the offeree receives
notice of this, can he after that make a binding contract by acceptance of
the offer?
|
Holding
|
No.
|
Reasons
|
The offer can not doubt be
withdrawn before its acceptance. Even
in cases where it’s indicated it’d be open for a certain period of time, so
long as it has not been accepted by the offeree.
In this case, before he
communicated acceptance to the defendant, the offeree knew the property had
been sold to a third party. So because
he had that knowledge, regardless that it didn’t come from the defendant, the
court said there can be no consensus adidem; no meeting of the minds.
|
Ratio
|
1) An offer can be withdrawn before it is accepted,
even if the offeror states that it will be open for a certain period of time,
but that revocation must be communicated to the offeree.
2) A revocation maybe effective if the offeree
learns indirectly that the offeror is no longer willing to stand by the
offer. That is the case because there
can be no consensus adidem.
|
Comments
|
Revocation doesn’t have to be communicated by the
offeror, it just needs to be known by the offeree.
|
Termination -
Invalid Revocation
Byrne v Von Tienhoven [1880],
(CPD)
|
|
Facts
|
On Oct 1, offerors (defendant) mails out an offer to
offeree (Byrne) to try and sell them 100 boxes of tin plates.
The offeree is in New York and gets the offer on Oct
11. They immediately accept by way of
telegram.
However, the offeror sent a revocation on Oct 8,
which was received on Oct 20. So:
Oct. 1 offer
Oct. 8 revocation
Oct. 11 acceptance
|
Issues
|
Whether withdrawal of an offer has any effect until
it is actually communicated to the person to whom the offer has been
sent? No.
Whether posting a letter of withdrawal is a
communication to the person to whom the letter is sent? No; it is different from the postal
acceptance rule.
|
Holding
|
No and no.
Offeree wins.
|
Reasons
|
It is a principle of law
that an offer can be withdrawn before it is accepted, and it is immaterial
whether the offer is expressed to be open for acceptance for a certain period
of time.
A non-communicated
recovation isn’t revocation at all.
The postal acceptance rule
does not apply to cases of withdrawal of an offer, only acceptance. The contract was therefore accepted and
binding on Oct. 11. This is because
the accepting party has no reason to believe the offer has been withdrawn up to
that point.
|
Ratio
|
1) The postal rule applies to acceptance, not
revocation.
2) It is a principle of law that an offer can be
withdrawn before it is accepted and it is immaterial whether or not the offer
is expressed to be opened for acceptance for a given time frame or not.
3) An uncommunicated revocation is no revocation at
all.
|
Comments
|
Errington v Errington & Woods
[1952], (?? CA)
|
|
Facts
|
Father buys house in his name for son and
daughter-in-law, pays 200 pounds, mortgages 500. Says title will be transferred once they
pay all the instalments.
A unilateral contract was made.
Father dies, and his estate is trying to revoke the
father’s offer.
|
Issues
|
If the daughter continues to pay all mortgage
payments, will the couple be entitled to have the property entitled to them?
|
Holding
|
Yes.
|
Reasons
|
Father promised the house
once they satisfied his conditions.
Court said a unilateral
offer cannot be revoked once the couple started acting on the condition. The only revocation in a unilateral
contract once they make the payments is if they fail to make any payments.
|
Ratio
|
The promisor cannot revoke a unilateral contract if
the offeree has started performance of the act that is required by the offer.
|
Comments
|
Termination – Lapse
Barrick v Clark [1951]
(SCC)
|
|
Facts
|
D to buy P’s farmland on Oct. 30; P gives
offer. D goes hunting and expects deal
to stay open. P sells to a third
party. D sues.
|
Issues
|
Given that there was no date for acceptance, what is
a reasonable time for the offer to stay open?
Did the offer lapse?
What point in time can the offeror go to sell to
another party?
|
Holding
|
The court construed the contract as the offer
lapsing. They tried to understand what
a reasonable time would be accounting for the character of the sale.
|
Reasons
|
TEST FOR REVOCATION: What constitutes a reasonable
time will depend on the character of the sale. They look at the circumstances of the
offer, including the conduct of the party and the negotiations.
ESTEY J.: The offeror’s offer didn’t specify a time
for acceptance, but asked that a reply be given ASAP. Offeree had reasonable time to make
acceptance by posting an acceptance to that effect. Estey focused on what “ASAP” meant in
regards to the offer; considered the nature of the thing being sold.
He concluded that the
offeree didn’t respond in a reasonable time.
The closing date was only 2 weeks after the offeree’s acceptance; too
soon to closing.
So three things the Court
looked at: ASAP, closing date, and down payment.
|
Ratio
|
When an offer doesn’t specify a time for acceptance, the offeree has
a reasonable time within which to make his acceptance. Nature of time depends on the nature of the
subject matter, the normal business pratice, and the circumstances of the
sale.
|
Comments
|
Formation of the Agreement: Certainty of Terms
In order for there to be a valid contract,
the parties have to reach agreement on all essential terms; price, quantity, shipping terms, and
delivery date. These are examples of
essential terms. Their meaning within
the contract has to be expressed with certainty.
When parties have not filled out these
terms, then the agreement will fail for lack of certainty of terms. It fails because there has not been
sufficient consensus adidem.
When we talk about certainty of terms, you
have to be careful to balance that requirement with that of business
transactions. There will be
circumstances where parties cannot ascertain the certainty of things that will
happen in the future. This is usually
the case in long term contracts, when there is a continuous supply of
something.
A rigid application of this essential terms
requirement could produce mischief, so you have to keep in mind when there’s a
business transaction at play.
Vagueness
Vagueness applies in cases where there’s a
contract and the terms are so vague that the court can’t give meaning to the
terms. These agreements fail for lack of certainty. This is a situation where the parties can’t
agree with the meanings of essential terms AND the courts can’t either.
Again, keep in mind we’re talking about
essential terms of the contract.
R v CAE Industries
[1986], (SCC)
|
|
Facts
|
Negotiations were taking place for D to take over an
aircraft base no longer needed by P.
Three governors wrote to D agreeing to maintain
present employment levels, contributing 7000 man hours per year. Department of defence said it couldn’t
guarantee 4000 hours a year, but promised to make their “best efforts” to
make amends.
P arranges for a subsidiary company to purchase the
aircraft base. The do this in 1971.
Work load at the base diminishes.
D sues for breach of contract, wins at CA. Now P is arguing that there was no contract
for vagueness.
|
Issues
|
Was a contract intended?
Is the contract vague, uncertain, or incomplete?
|
Holding
|
A contract was intended. The department of defence said it would
make its “best efforts”.
The contract is not vague.
|
Reasons
|
The important thing here
is the use of the words “best efforts”.
Regarding the first issue,
the court said that there was an intention to make a contract, and this is
evidenced in the fact that P began doing the work and the obligations were
treated as binding by both parties.
The onus of
proof is on the person who is claiming there is no binding contract, and the
onus is a heavy one.
P did not meet that onus.
The Court didn’t buy the
argument that the contract was void for uncertainty and vagueness, as they
said “before a contract fails on the
grounds of uncertainty, every effort should be made to find meaning to the
term.
The Court was able to use
the language to find a binding obligation.
“Best efforts” created a broad application to secure man hours. The government didn’t have to sacrifice the
contractual obligations of other projects and allocate the hours to CAE, but
they did have to use their “best efforts” to “leave no stone unturned”.
|
Ratio
|
1) Government pronouncements may be binding rather
than just a mere statement of intention.
2) The Court will use an objective test, the reasonable person test, to determine
the government’s intention.
3) Contracts will not be held void for uncertainty
if the terms can be meaningfully construed.
4) Public interest must be kept in mind in
determining if a government contract exists.
|
Comments
|
Incomplete
Terms
When you determine whether the parties have
agreed to the essential terms of a particular agreement, there’s an assessment
as to whether there are missing terms and whether those missing terms are so
important that they warrant an agreement to fail.
In a commercial context, you’ll have to
rely on the context of that industry to give meaning and intention to some
terms. In other scenarios, you may have
a routine in the industry that requires specific essential terms to be agreed
upon, and if the agreement misses these terms, there can be a failure of that
agreement.
You’ll have to look at the circumstances of
the industry, the practice of the parties or if the parties have entered into
past agreements, and whether they are workable for those parties.
So there are many places to look if missing
terms constitute the failure of an agreement.
May and Butcher v R
[1934] (HL)
|
|
Facts
|
Agreement was made for P to buy tents from D.
D agreed to sell entire stock with the price and
delivery times to be agreed on later.
D changes its mind because of a change in board
member.
P sues bringing an injunction against D for selling
the tents.
|
Issues
|
Whether or not the terms of the contract were
sufficiently defined to constitute a legally binding contract between the
parties.
|
Holding
|
No.
|
Reasons
|
P says there is a contract
and terms are sufficiently defined.
The court says it isn’t a
legally binding contract. There was
never a legally binding contract because two parties entering into an
agreement must define all essential terms.
The essential term missing
is price. They said price was to be
left to be settled in future. Courts
said this was an incomplete essential term.
The court didn’t look at
the delivery term, because that can be in a continuum.
P argued Sales and Goods
Act (SOGA) allowed for price to be fixed at reasonable price, but the Court
didn’t buy this because the contract said the price would be determined from
“time to time”, therein negating SOGA.
|
Ratio
|
1) A reference to a future agreement may not
necessarily be construed as an intention not to be bound.
2) An agreement between parties to agree in the
future on an essential term, such as price, is no contract at all.
|
Comments
|
Courts will always use a contextual analysis to see
if the term is essential.
|
Not Incomplete
Terms (Distinguished from May and Butler):
Future Performance Contract
Hillas & Co. v Arcos Ltd.
[1932] (HL)
|
|
Facts
|
D gives P favourable terms to buy Russian timber at
a reduced price. There was an option
of entering into a contract in the agreement, so if P wanted to elect to use
the option, they would communicate it.
P was entitled to a reduction of 5% of the official
price.
D ends up selling all of its timber to a third
party. D is arguing that the option
was not certain enough, so there was no binding contract.
|
Issues
|
Was the option clause, from the first agreement, a
binding agreement?
|
Holding
|
Yes.
|
Reasons
|
LOWER COURT REASONING:
Said there was no binding
agreement; it was a future agreement to agree so therefore no contract at
all. Appeal Court relied on May and
Butcher where it was determined that if essential terms are missing, then the
contract fails.
LORD WRIGHT:
Says there are no
uncertain terms in this agreement. It
was no dependent on any future agreement.
Wright said the Courts
have to look at the documents to construe an agreement, and this was enough
to suggest a binding agreement.
Clause 9, the clause that
specified the reduced price, gave an offer.
All P had to do was exercise that offer. They said this was a future performance agreement.
This agreement was the distinguishing factor which made the contract
not fail for incomplete terms.
The court
read the contract as a whole and, from the entire reading, are able to
ascertain what fair specification meant.
So in the exam, take the contract as a whole, not as piecemeal.
|
Ratio
|
1) A Court will strain to find a contract where
common sense tells you that there is one.
2) In contracts for future performance over a period
of time, parties may not be able, nor may they desire, to specify many
matters of detail, such as delivery (but not limited to delivery), but leave
them to be adjusted in the working out of a contract, and this is still a
valid contract.
|
Comments
|
Distinguish this case from Butcher. In Hillas, we have a future performance
contract.
|
Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd.
[1934], (CA)
|
|
Facts
|
D agreed to purchase land from P. This agreement was subject to D entering a
supplemental agreement to purchase all petroleum from P. The price was “a price to be agreed by the parties in writing from time to time”. There was an arbitration clause.
For three years, all gas was bought from P. But after this, D began buying from
elsewhere for cheaper.
P seeks an injunction.
|
Issues
|
Was the supplemental agreement between the parties
binding?
|
Holding
|
Yes, it was binding.
|
Reasons
|
D argues that the price,
an essential term, was not defined, using the Butcher case.
The Court says the parties
believed they had an agreement and acted on it without any disputes. The Court wanted to give effect to this
agreement and said there should be a term that is read into the contract that
the price is a reasonable price.
|
Ratio
|
Whether there has been a course of dealings in the
past, missing terms, like price, may be applied and a reasonable price
assumed.
|
Comments
|
This
can be a rebuttal to Butcher.
|
Agreements to
Negotiate
Agreements to agree.
When parties into agreements about the
future, the question is whether those agreements to agree are enforceable by
law.
From Hillas,
we see Lord Wright talking about how agreements to agree can, in some
circumstances can, in some circumstances, be enforceable. In Canada, however, agreements to agree are
not enforceable.
Lord Denning in Courtney v Fairburn says that Lord Wright has it wrong and says
agreements to agree are unenforceable for two reasons:
1)
They’re so uncertain that courts can’t interpret them to make them enforceable.
2) If a court were to accept an agreement
to agree, it’d be hard for the court to
estimate damages if there were such a breach.
Lord Denning’s position is the reigning law
in Canada. Such agreements fall under
this section because they fail for lack of certainty.
Valid
Agreements to Negotiate
Empress Towers Ltd. v Bank of Nova
Scotia
|
|
Facts
|
There was a lease made between the two parties,
first in 1972, which expired in 1984.
In 1984, there was a new lease that had a clause that said “renewal
for any period shall be at the market rental price at the time”. It was also subject to the mutual agreement
of the parties.
The tenant wanted to exercise the option to renew,
and proposed a rate of $5400/month, determined with the help of appraisers as
the market rental value. The
solicitors for the landlord write back and propose a month-by-month lease
that begins with a $15000 deposit and have the rate of $5400/month apply
thereafter.
The plaintiff brought the case to the Court to
repossess the tenant’s lease space.
|
Issues
|
Whether the renewal clause was void, either for
uncertainty or what is fundamentally the same as an agreement to agree.
|
Holding
|
The renewal clause was not void.
|
Reasons
|
The Courts give the proper
legal effect to any clause in the agreement that the parties understood and
intended to have legal effect. Here
the Courts talked about what the mutual agreement under the renewal clause meant,
and found that the reason the landlord made the clause was so they would not
have to accept a rate lower than the previous lease agreement.
Traditionally, an
agreement to agree does not create an enforceable agreement or contract, but
in this case they had something they could ascertain as definite, which was
the “market rental rate”, and because this was a number that could be arrived
at with some certainty, an obligation to have good faith negotiations implied
seeking out this price.
The Courts then mention
two principles: the business
efficiency test and the officious
bystander test (you can only imply a term into a contract if, at the time
the contract was entered into, both parties would have intended for that term
to be inserted into the contract).
The Court held that the
landlord did not negotiate in good faith.
|
Ratio
|
1) The courts will try, whenever possible, to give
proper legal effect to any clause the parties understood and intended to have
legal effect.
2) In a case where there is a standard by which to
measure a duty, such as market value, the courts will imply terms of
negotiating in good faith and not withholding agreements unreasonably to
promote the business effiency test and the officious bystander principles.
|
Comments
|
Invalid Agreements
to Negotiate
Mannparr Enterprises Ltd. v Canada [1999]
(BC CA)
|
|
Facts
|
P was given a five year permit to remove and sell
sand and gravel off reserve lands.
Had a renewal clause indicating a right to renew for
a further five years; it was contingent on satisfactory performance and a
renegotiation of the royalty rate and annual surface rate.
Both parties expected the operation to last for ten
years, which is how long they expected it to take.
|
Issues
|
1) Having regard to the language used to permit the
agreement, was the renewal clause uncertain?
2) Ought there have to have been an implied term
requiring the defendant to negotiate for the renewal or negotiate in good
faith for the renewal?
|
Holding
|
1) Yes, it was uncertain.
2) No, because there was no contract, so it was
unenforceable.
|
Reasons
|
Court looked at facts and
language used by parties. Wanted to
see if both parties would have likely agreed to such terms. They refer again to the officious bystander test; you can
only apply a term into a contract if, at the time of the contract, both
parties would have intended for that term to be included.
A term can also be implied
by the business efficiency test.
The term “renegotiation”
was used by the Crown to reserve a right to refuse to enter into any more
negotiations; if the band wanted P gone, they had to be able to exercise
that.
The Court also noted that
there was no arbitration clause either.
|
Ratio
|
1) Each contract must be looked at in the context of
its own facts and the language used by the parties.
2) The implication of a term can only be made if it
is the case that both parties would be likely to agree that such a term
should be implied in order to satisfy the officious bystander test.
3) A term can be implied in a contract if is it
found to be necessary by a court in order to give business efficacy to the
contract. A court will not, however,
imply a term into a contract merely because the court may think that such
terms would be reasonable or would likely be more satisfactory.
4) A duty to negotiate in good faith will not be
implied into an agreement if there is no language that can provide an
objective benchmark to measure such a duty as fair value or market value.
|
Comments
|
Wellington City Council v Body Corporate
51702 (Wellington) [2002], (Aust CA)
Agreement
to agree is not enforceable
|
|
Facts
|
P breached a process contract (a contract that
requires the parties to negotiate in good faith and not less than market
value) and are being sued.
There was a clause that the council officers will
negotiate in good faith, and that council would sell their leasehold interest
at no less than the current market value of those interests.
|
Issues
|
Was there a legally enforceable contract in
existence?
|
Holding
|
No.
|
Reasons
|
The Court said there are
two things; the process contract and the actual contract that was being
worked towards. The Court said the
enforceability of contracts to negotiate will depend on the terms and
specifity of those terms; if they’re sufficiently clear, than they’re
enforceable.
The Court says “good
faith” is a subjective standard, and there is no objective criteria to decide
whether each party is in breach of the obligation.
|
Ratio
|
1) The enforceability of contracts to negotiate will
depend on their terms and particularly on the specificity of those
terms.
2) For there to be an enforceable contract, the
parties had to reach consensus on all essential terms or at least upon
objective means of sufficient certainty by which those terms will be
determined.
|
Comments
|
This isn’t law in Canada, but it’s an argument you
can use.
Lord Denning doesn’t like enforcing an agreement to
agree because it lacks precision.
|
Anticipation of Formalization
Talking about negotiations where, after the
negotiations, the parties are supposed to commit to the negotiation in
writing. The issue is whether the
negotiation legally binding if a written document isn’t made.
Issues that arise:
a)
If the parties intended to be bound by the terms
b)
If those terms are sufficiently certain to give rise to a contract.
So this arises when parties have come to a
level of inetent, agree on certain terms of the contract, but they have yet to
formalize their agreement by making a written contract.
Bawitko Investments v Kernels Popcorn
[1991], (Ont CA)
|
|
Facts
|
P makes an oral agreement with D to open up a
franchise. Judge found they agreed on
price, length of the contract, and renewal, and these terms were different
than those found on the normal franchise contract. There were four agreements.
Both parties intended to draft a formal written
agreement which never happened. P then
commenced an action.
|
Issues
|
Was the oral contract a complete and binding
contract or was its enforceability subject to the parties’ subsequent
agreement on all the terms and agreements to be contained in the contemplated
written franchise agreement?
|
Holding
|
It wasn’t a binding contract. There was no complete and enforceable
contract.
|
Reasons
|
The parties didn’t agree
on the essential terms of the contract, as there were those four agreements
were not fully reached. Because of
this, legal obligations are deferred until a formal contract has been
approved and executed, and the original agreement cannot constitute an
enforceable contract. So here the
parties were found to clearly have contemplated a written document.
There was a draft agreement, but the Court
said because it was a draft, there couldn’t be formal terms binding both
parties.
|
Ratio
|
1) When all the essential provisions to be
incorporated in a formal document are decided upon, and there is an intention
that the agreement shall thereupon become binding, the parties will have
fulfilled all the requisites for the formation of a contract. The fact that a formal written document to
the same effect is to be subsequently prepared and signed does not alter the
binding validity of the original contract.
2) When the original contract is incomplete because
essential provisions intended to govern the contractual relationship have not
been settled or agreed upon, or the contract is too uncertain or general to
be valid, and is dependent on the making of a formal contract, or the
understanding or the intention of the parties, even if there is no
uncertainty as to the terms of their agreement,
|
Comments
|
Consideration
Consideration is an exchange of promises,
and because there is one person who is the promissory making the initial
promise, the promissee is the one giving
the consideration.
On the exam, you’ll likely have to ask “is
there consideration to support the promise?”.
Exchange and Bargains:
No Consideration
The Governors of Dalhousie College at Halifax
v the Estate of Arthur
Boutiler [1934], (SCR)
No
consideration for Boutiler’s pledge despite of detrimental reliance
|
|
Facts
|
Promissor makes promise to give $5000 donation to
promisee. Promissor dies before paying
amount.
Promissee says the consideration is sufficient
because of (1) the pledges made by others and (2) that the money go to the
construction of new buildings.
|
Issues
|
Was there good and sufficient consideration to make a
binding contract?
|
Holding
|
No.
|
Reasons
|
Court didn’t buy these
arguments; the fact that others were making pledges cannot be used as
considerations. The Court also argues
that the agreement didn’t preclude the College from expropriating the funds
any way they wish, whether it be for the construction of new buildings or
other projects. So there was no
request by the deceased to specifically use the money to construct new
buildings and fulfill the needs of the growing constituency.
The Courts said the way
this promise was established was as a voluntary matter. Something specific tied to the request of
the promissor is necessary. There must
at least be some kind of objective.
|
Ratio
|
A charitable pledge, even though formally made and
seriously intended, is considered to be a mere gift and even a detrimental
reliance of the party to who it is made is not sufficient consideration.
|
Comments
|
A combination of this case and the following case
(Brantford Hospital) are the current law in Canada.
|
Brantford General Hospital v Marquis Estate [2003],
(Ont. SCJ)
Lady’s
million dollar donation doesn’t have consideration
|
|
Facts
|
Woman promises to donate one million dollars to
hospital. Hospital offers to name the
wing after the woman and her deceased husband; but the woman herself never
specifically makes the request. It was
also subject to the Board of Director’s approval.
In the pledge document, there’s no mention of the
new unit being named after the woman or her husband.
She dies and leaves a 800k outstanding.
So the hospital is arguing that it’s consideration
is that the hospital would be named after the woman and her husband.
|
Issues
|
Does the pledge constitute a legal and binding
contract enforceable by law or does it fail for lack of consideration?
|
Holding
|
It fails for lack of consideration. It is not a binding contract.
|
Reasons
|
The Court said the naming
of the new unit cannot be used as sufficient consideration. Especially considering it was never
mentioned in the pledge and it was subject to approval by head director. Also because it was never requested or made
it a condition to the pledge that the new unit be named after her.
|
Ratio
|
For a pledge to be considered an enforceable
contract, consideration must be shown.
|
Comments
|
Exchange and
Bargains: Consideration Present
Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
[1917], (US NY)
US
decision; not binding
|
|
Facts
|
Promissor, Lucy, is a fashion designer who gives
promisee the exclusive right to place endorsements and sell designs. The Promissee promises in return to give
promissor half of the profits and revenues.
Promissor turned out to be putting her endorsement
without his consent.
Promissee sues for breach of contract.
|
Issues
|
Was there consideration and, if so, can the contract
be enforceable when there is no explicit promise made by the plaintiff?
|
Holding
|
Yes, there was consideration.
|
Reasons
|
The defendant made an
implied promise for the promissee to get endorsements to create profits. So the implied promise was to put in
reasonable efforts to get a profit and then render that profit to promissor.
Promisee’s promise was to
pay half the profits that resulted from the exclusive agency agreement, and
it was a promise to use reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues.
|
Ratio
|
An implied promise of one party can be sufficient to
constitute consideration for a contract, and to support a cause of action
against the other party for breach of contract.
Courts will reach to find something reasonable for
the purposes of salvaging an enforceable contract.
|
Comments
|
Past
Consideration: No Consideration
Eastwood v Kenyon
[1840], (QB)
|
|
Facts
|
The plaintiff promissor is a guardian of the
promissee who paid for the promisee’s education when she was younger. At the time, the promisee promised to pay
the promissor back when she was older.
When the promissee grows up, she doesn’t make the payments.
The defendant is the promisee’s husband, who agreed
to pay back the amount with his wife.
|
Issues
|
Is there a binding contract for the amount due or
does it fail for lack of consideration?
|
Holding
|
There is no binding contract because there is no
consideration. Past consideration is no consideration.
|
Reasons
|
The promissee’s promise
was past consideration. Moreover, the
promissor’s promise was a voluntary gift that, although promised to be paid
back, was not consideration to pay back the now existing promise.
There’s no binding
contract for lack of consideration, it was just a past benefit not conferred
at the request of the defendant.
|
Ratio
|
Past consideration is no consideration at all.
A pre-existing moral duty does not confer
consideration. (This is done for
policy reasons, as courts don’t want people making voluntary promises and
then expecting repayments of gifts.
|
Comments
|
Past
Consideration: Consideration Present
Lampleigh v Brathwaite
[1615], (KB)
|
|
Facts
|
D needed to get a pardon from the King. Implores help from P to get pardon. P says “I’ll do this” and puts in effort to
ultimately get pardon for D. D
promises after the pardon to pay him 100 dollars, but eventually doesn’t pay.
|
Issues
|
Is there a contract or does it fail for lack of
consideration?
|
Holding
|
Yes, there is a contract.
|
Reasons
|
A voluntary act,
obviously, does not have consideration to uphold an action.
On the other hand, if the act was completed at the request
of the defendant, this would constitute sufficient consideration.
IMPORTANT DISTINGUISHING
ELEMENT:
The request was made by D
to do the thing that was promised.
|
Ratio
|
A request coupled with a promise to pay amounts to a
binding contract even though the request and the promise are separated.
|
Comments
|
Peppercorn
Theory: If something of value is exchanged in
return of something of lesser value, then the contract is still
enforceable. The Courts won’t look at
the adequacy of the consideration; whether the deal was fair. Only that consideration is present. In some circumstances though, if the
disparity is so great to “shock the conscience”, consideration will not be
found.
Thomas v Thomas
|
|
Facts
|
Husband was going to give all of his estate to his
brother. On death bed, gives a house
to his wife.
The brother agrees to fulfill husband’s wish, and
give her possession of the house on the condition that she pays 1 pound
yearly. The brother dies, and the
executors refuse to convey the property to the wife.
|
Issues
|
Was there an obligation to allow the wife to retain
possession of the house under the contract?
|
Holding
|
Yes, there was an obligation.
|
Reasons
|
The real issue was whether
the 1 pound was enough value in the eyes of the court to constitute
consideration. Court says that the
annual one pound fee was “fresh apportionment of ground rent”; it wasn’t
merely a gift. This was enough to
uphold the contract.
|
Ratio
|
Consideration may be something small as long as it
is of some value in the eyes of the court.
The consideration generally flows from the promisee.
|
Comments
|
Pre-existing Legal Duty
Where one person promises to do something
for another in return for something, but they’re promising is something they’re
already legally bound to do. So
consideration for one party is being used for another.
You can’t use what you’re legally bound to
do as consideration for a new agreement.
Pre-existing legal duties also include
public duties, so like police officers are obligated to tend to a crime scene. Any money offered to him to tend to a crime
scene will fail for want of consideration; public duty cannot be used as
consideration. This also includes public
duties that civilians owe, like the responsibility to report a crime; you can’t
pay someone to report a crime when it’s happening.
Duties Owed to
a Third Party
Pao
On v Lau Yiu Long allows promises made to one party
good consideration for promises to another party.
Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980], (PC)
|
|
Facts
|
First Contract: A side agreement is entered into
between P and D to exchange shares in their respective companies. P was
concerned that D’s shares might not hold value. The parties then made a side agreement in
which D guaranteed the value of their shares at a certain price; P would sell
D’s shares back to D if the D’s shares went up, and if D’s shares went down,
P would buy back their own shares.
This side agreement was with the shareholders (the third party).
Second Contract: P threatened not to allow the
transaction. In reply, they made an
agreement which substituted
|
Issues
|
Was there good consideration given in the given in
the context of the second side agreement, or was it a promise to perform a
pre-existing duty in want of consideration?
|
Holding
|
Yes, there was consideration.
|
Reasons
|
Quite simply: you can use
your promise to one party as consideration to another promise.
|
Ratio
|
An act done before the giving of a promise (the
second promise) to make a payment, or give a benefit, can sometimes be
consideration for the promise.
The requirements for this are that:
A) The act must be done at the
promissor’s request (D’s)
B)
Parties must have understood that the act was to be given in exchange for a
payment or a conferment of some
benefit.
C)
Payment or the giving of a benefit must have legally been enforceable had it
been promised in advance.
|
Comments
|
Promises to
Accept More
No
Consideration
Courts will generally find that in cases
where there is a promise to accept more in a contract, there is no consideration. The only exception is when a promise to
accept more is in consideration for finishing a project on time.
Stilk
v Myrick: No consideration for crewmembers to make
more money for a voyage.
Gilbert
Steel: No
consideration for the increase in the price of steel claimed by promissor.
Greater
Fredericton Airport Authority v Nav Canada: No
consideration for
Stilk v Myrick
[1809] (Eng KB)
|
|
Facts
|
Two men abandon a ship, and the captain agrees to
distribute the resulting surplus to each of the workers.
When the ship returns home, the captain (D) refuses
to pay sailors (P) the rest of the money.
|
Issues
|
Were the sailors entitled to a higher rate of
wages? No.
Was there consideration for the promise to pay
higher wages? No.
|
Holding
|
Rules in favour of the defendant, the captain.
|
Reasons
|
The agreement is void for
want of consideration. The promise of
the captain did not have any consideration on the side of the remaining
sailors. The sailors also agreed
before hand that they would do what they could if the ship were to come into
an emergency. The two men abandoning the ship was some kind of emergency.
|
Ratio
|
The performance of a pre-existing contractual duty
which is already owed to the promissory is no consideration for another
contract
|
Comments
|
KEY: There was an article that formed the basis of a
pre-existing legal duty.
|
Gilbert Steel Ltd. v University Const. Ltd. [1976],
(Ont CA)
|
|
Facts
|
Agreement for P (Gilbert Steel, the builder) to build using
fabricated steel. The price in
fabricated steel goes up after the agreement, and P wants to pass on the
increase of price to D.
D agrees to pay the higher price.
There is another increase in the price of the steel,
and an unexecuted contract is drafted by P.
P is now suing D for the price of the increase in
steel.
|
Issues
|
Was the agreement to pay the higher prices legally
binding upon D or did the agreement fail for lack of consideration? Failed for lack of consideration.
|
Holding
|
The defendant won because there was no consideration
on the part of P for D to pay for the increase.
|
Reasons
|
So consideration cannot be
used in cases where more money is required when the parties have already made
an agreement.
|
Ratio
|
1) Promise to perform a pre-existing contractual
duty already owed to the promissor does not constitute consideration without
something more (same proposition as Slitk).
2) Where the parties have agreed to a mutual
rescission of a prior agreement and the substitution of a new one, the new
agreement is binding even though it may place increased burdens on one party
alone.
|
Comments
|
Greater Fredericton Airport Authority v Nav
Canada [2008], (NB CA)
|
|
Facts
|
Federal government entered into an agreement with D
to assume navigational responsibilities for all airports. Later, P assumes the responsibility of
overlooking D, as part of a new legislation, so not it’s between P and D.
P suggests that D should relocate landing system
onto another runway. D replies that it
would make more sense to just replace it with a new measuring distance
system.
There was a dispute over who should pay for it.
D refuses to relocate unless P pays for new
equipment. P agrees.
But D goes out and buys the equipment, and then
seeks payment from P.
|
Issues
|
Was the promise made by P to pay for the new
equipment supported by consideration?
No, it wasn’t.
|
Holding
|
The airport authority is not obligated to pay for
the new equipment.
|
Reasons
|
D promised nothing in
return for P to pay for the equipment.
|
Ratio
|
|
Comments
|
Intention to Create Legal Relations
“Animus contrahendi” = intention to create
legal relations.
These cases are about what facts can lead
to an intention to create legal relations.
Domestic
Arrangements
Balfour v Balfour [1919],
(Eng CA)
|
|
Facts
|
Husband makes promise to wife for 30 pound allowance
per month.
They get divorced, and D (husband) refuses to pay.
Trial judge found for wife, so this is the appeal by
the husband.
|
Issues
|
Was there an intention to create legal relations?
|
Holding
|
No.
|
Reasons
|
Relies on proposition that
agreements in a domestic context do not constitute an intention to create
legal relations. These agreements are
outside the realm of contracts altogether.
Court argued that the onus
is on the person trying to prove an intentional to create legal relations,
and the wife failed that onus.
|
Ratio
|
Closely associated parties (like domestic arrangements)
will be presumed not to intend to create legal relations in the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary.
|
Comments
|
Commercial
Arrangements
Here, it is generally assumed that there is
an intention to create legal relations in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary.
But parties can actually put clauses into
their agreements which immune themselves from being legally bound. This is possible.
There are also situations where a contract
is negotiated, but it interrupted before it is formed. The question in these cases is whether such
arrangements were intended to be enforceable.
The reason the question arises is because you want to know if those
preliminary agreements at that stage were to be enforceable before writing.
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